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Introduction 
Both France and the United States have recently experienced major 
political changes. As a result, current economic policy is different from 
what it was, and even larger changes are anticipated in the coming years. 
Although the goal of those policies is to accomplish structural changes, 
stronger defense and less government intervention in the U.S., more equal 
income distribution and industrial reorganization in France, they will have 
and already are having macroeconomic effects on investment, consumption and 
employment. High anticipated deficits are blamed for the high long-term 
real interest rates in the U.S. I anticipations of a higher fiscal burden 
on firms are blamed for the sluggishness of private investment in France. 
The purpose of this paper is to present a model in which effects of 
anticipated as well as current changes in policy can be analyzed. Techni-
cally the model is an intertemporal disequilibrium model with rational 
expectations, i.e. a model in which agents take the anticipated future 
into consideration as rationally as they can, but where prices and wages 
may not adjust fast enough to maintain full employment. The paper therefore 
builds on two recent strands of research in macroeconomic fluctuations: 
rational intertemporal choice and disequilibrium analysis. 
The first approach has emphasized that most decisions are intertemporal 
and thus depend as much on anticipated as on current prices. It has focused 
in particular on intertemporal substitution of consumption or leisure by 
households, on the optimal employment-investment decisions by firms (see 
for example, books by Barro [3], Lucas [18], Sargent [24]). This approach 
has led to a better understanding of the dynamic effects of either policies 
or real disturbancr,s (in OUl own work for example, fiscal policy [2], oil 
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price shocks [22]). Almost all of the work in this area has, however, 
maintained the assumption of market clearing, at least in the goods market 
(Hall [12] and Sachs [22] allow for a non labor market clearing real wage) . 
The second approach, disequilibrium theory, has emphasized that, if 
prices are not fully flexible, most decisions must take into account not 
only prices but quantity constraints. It has focused in particular on the 
implications for consumption and labor supply decisions by households, and 
for employment decisions of firms, giving a better foundation to many 
standard macroeconomic relations. It has shown how equilibria correspond 
to different regimes, each with distinct implications for policy. Although 
most of the work in this area has recognized the potential importance of 
anticipated future constraints (most notably Malinvaud [20]), it has usually 
not modeled behavior explicitly as intertemporal or considered the implica-
tions of rational expectations (an exception is Neary and Stiglitz [21]). 
Can both approaches be combined? We believe that they can, in that 
agents attempt to make rational choices and to anticipate the future, even 
when some prices are not fully flexible. We realize that the assumption of 
rational expectations is overly strong and the lack of explicit foundations 
of price inertia is unsettling. Rational expectations appear however to be 
the most neutral way of allowing agents' decisions to depend on the future. 
We also believe that a model with more firmly grounded price inertia 
(possibly from desynchronization, such as in [25] and [8]) would lead to 
similar results, although we have not in this model attempted such an 
d k ' (1) un erta lng. 
The model we derive is slightly beyond analytical tractability. An 
analytical treatment can only be offered by taking shortcuts, something 
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we have explored in [6], (9). The choice here has been to solve the 
complete model by numerical simulations. Given that the model is derived 
from maximizing behavior and that its size is small enough, results can 
easily be traced to specific assumptions about parameters and policy. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section I characterizes households' 
and firms' behavior, as well as the intertemporal equilibrium. In 
particular, it clarifies the role of short and long interest rates in 
investment and consumption decisions, and the relation between market value, 
profit, profitability, the real wage and investment. It shows how the 
expectation of future constraints may lead to anticipatory buying by 
consumers and firms. Section II displays the basic dynamic mechanisms of 
the model, through a focus on the following questions: What is the role 
of investment, both through demand and supply, in the transmission of 
shocks, a question stressed by Malinvaud [20]? Can sharp deflations in 
response to lower money growth be destabilizing, as suggested by Keynes 
and more recently by Tobin [26]? Is the responsiveness of real wages to 
unemployment stabilizing or destabilizing, a question raised throughout 
the research on disequilibrium (starting with Barro-Grossman [4])? 
Section III returns to one of the policy issues relevant in France today: 
What happens if firms anticipate an increase in their fiscal burden in the 
future? No attempt is made to fit specific facts and magnitudes, our 
intention being to clarify the various economic forces set in play by such 
anticipations. More generally, our focus in most of the paper is as much 
on methodology as on substantive economic issues. Carefully calibrated 
simulation models will be necessary to reach firm answers to many of the 
issues raised in the paper. 
4 
Section I. The Model 
General description 
Our choice has been to build the simplest model in which households 
and firms have nontrivial intertemporal choices. Thus, we assume that the 
economy is closed and that there is one produced good, used either for 
consumption or investment. There are three tradable assets, money, debt 
and equities. 
Households and firms take as given both current and anticipated prices 
and quantity constraints. Although the future may be uncertain, they act 
, f h k ' 'h ' ( 2 ) h Id 11 ' d ' 1 d as l t ey now It Wlt certalnty. House 0 s are a l entlca an 
maximize the discounted sum of utility; their problem is intertemporal as 
they have to choose between consumption now or consumption later. Firms 
are identical and maximize their value, which is the discounted sum of 
anticipated cash flows. Labor is a variable factor but capital is quasi-
fixed: changes in capital are costly, so that the investment decision 
presents also an intertemporal problem. 
The solutions to the maximization problems of households and firms 
give a set of actual demands (or supplies) which satisfy both the budget 
constraint and (current and anticipated) quantity constraints. (These are, 
in the disequilibrium terminology, "Dreze" demands [11]). We can also, for 
both maximization problems, find for each constraint the lowest value of 
this constraint such that it is not binding. We shall refer to this set 
of values as the set of shadow demands (these correspond to "Benassy" 
demands). It follows that each actual demand can be expressed as the 
minimum of the constraint and the shadow demand. 
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Each market has rationing rules governing the allocation of goods to 
the constrained side; we allow these rules to depend on shadow demands. 
Market clearing requires that two conditions be satisfied: the first is 
that at most one side of the market be constrained, the second that actual 
demand and actual supply be equal. We follow others in this field by 
allowing asset prices to adjust and thus asset markets to clear. We do 
not however follow standard usage in our treatment of the labor market: 
we assume that households supply all the labor demanded by firms and that 
firms are therefore never constrained in the labor market. By doing so, 
we eliminate the regime of "repressed inflation" (following Malinvaud's 
terminology [19]) and are left with only two regimes, a "Keynesian regime" 
when suppliers of goods are constrained and a "classical regime" when 
buyers of goods are constrained. We feel that little is lost by this 
simplification, at least for the experiments we consider, and that the 
benefit in increased simplicity is substantial. 
Prices adjust over time as functions, not of excess actual demands 
which are, by construction, identically zero, but of excess shadow demands. 
At any time t, an intertemporal equilibrium is a sequence of shadow 
demands, a sequence of actual demands and a sequence of prices, consistent 
with maximizing behavior and the rationing rules, such that both current 
and future markets are anticipated to clear. If exogenous variables take 
over time their anticipated values, the intertemporal equilibrium is 
actually realized over time. If at some time t+T, there are unanticipated 
changes in current or anticipated exogenous variables, a new intertemporal 
equilibrium for period t + T and future periods must be recomputed. 
We now describe the model in detail. 
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The behavior of firms 
All firms are identical and we shall not distinguish between individual 
and aggregate values. The time index t will also be deleted, whenever 
convenient. 
The technology of the firm is characterized by: 
A production function, with constant returns to scale: 
Q F(K, L) 
An installation function, giving the number of goods used up in installation 
f . f' (3) o I unlts 0 lnvestment: 
I¢ (11K) ¢ (0)= 0 , ¢ I (.) > 0 
The total number of goods needed to invest at rate I is therefore: 
J I + I¢ (11K) I (1 + ¢ (11K) ) 
An accumulation equation, with exponential depreciation at rate ~: 
. 
K I - j..lK 
The firm takes as given the sequence of real wages and real interest 
rates {W/P, r}t=o, •.. ,oo and the sequence of constraints on the amount of 
goods it can sell and the amount of goods it can invest, {Q, I}t=o, ... oo' 
By assumption, there are no constraints on the amount of labor it can buy. 




oo -J r ds 






-J r ds 
o s 
qt be the costate variable associated with the accumulation 
equation, and A
Q
, AI the Lagrangians associated with the quantity 
\ 
constraints; the Hamiltonian is therefore: 
-Jtr ds 
H = e 0 s [F(K, L) - (W/P)L - 1(1 + ~(I/K» + q(I - ~K) 
Necessary conditions for maximization are: 
W/P 
1 + (I/K)~' (I/K) + ~(I/K) = q- AI 
A > 0 
Q 
A (i - I) = 0 
I 






They can be rewritten more intuitively as follows: 
Define shadow labor demand and quantity supply Ld, QS s.t.: 
(1) 
(2) Then Q . (s -) ml.n Q , Q LIF(K, L) = Q 
Define shadow investment and investment spending, Id, Jd s.t.: 
(3) q 





(r+j.l)q - (W/P) (FK(K, L)/FL(K, L» - (I/K)2¢, (I/K) 
t -J r ds 
lim e 
o s o 
Given the capital stock, the real wage and the possibly binding output 
constraint, the employment and output decisions of the firm are straight-
forward. The investment decision is of more interest and is characterized 
by equations 3 through 6: To see what they imply, we can rewrite them 
further. Inverting (3), and integrating (5) forward subject to the 






min(I I I) H (q) H(l) o H'(.»O 
Investment is the minimum of shadow investment and the constraint. 
Shadow investment in turn depends on q, the present value of marginal 
profits, usually called Tobin's q. Marginal profit is the sum of two 
terms; the second is the reduction in the cost of installation made possible 
by an additional unit of capital and is a minor factor in profits. The 
first is more interesting and depends very much on the regime. 
In the classical regime, i.e. if the firm is not output constrained, 
the marginal product of labor equals the wage and this first term is simply 
the marginal product of capital. Furthermore, if the firm does not 
anticipate to be ever output constrained in the future, a particularly 
nice result arises: the shadow price q is equal to the observable average 
value of capital V/K (Hayashi [13]). In the absence of constraints on 
investment spending, there is then a direct relation between the firm's 
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value and its investment behavior. An increase in the real wage for example 
decreases employment, the marginal product of capital, and thus investment 
and the value of the firm. 
In the Keynesian regime, the firm is output constrained. The first 
term then is the marginal wage savings, i.e. the real wage times the 
marginal rate of substitution. There is no longer a close relation between 
q and V/K, between investment and the value of the firm. The effect of an 
increase in the real wage is now to increase the marginal wage savings and 
to increase q and investment as capital becomes more attractive than labor 
to produce the same level of output. Although it now increases investment, 
the increase in the wage still decreases profit and thus the value of the 
firm. An increase in output increases both marginal and average profit and 
(4) 
thus both q and V/K. The effect on marginal profit however depends on 
the elasticity of substitution(S) while the effect on average profit does 
not. 
Finally, the effects of a constraint on investment demand are easily 
characterized. Anticipated constraints on investment demand lead, ceteris 
paribus, to an anticipated lower capital accumulation, thus to higher 
marginal profits, to a higher q and higher investment demand today. It 
therefore generates anticipatory buying of investment goods. The effect 
is represented graphically in Figure 1. 
Since asset markets are assumed to clear and the financial structure 
of firms is thus irrelevant for firms' or agents' decisions, the following 
structure is convenient: Firms have real debt B outstanding, paying the 
real interest rate. They finance all investment from retained earnings 
and do not issue new debt or new equity. The assumption that there is 
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Figure 1. Anticipatory purchases of investment goods 
I 
-path if constraint I 















path if constraint C 







The present value of Ao' A2 areas equals the present value of Al 
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real debt outstanding implies that there is an observable interest rate but 
is otherwise irrelevant. (The assumption that all investment is internally 
financed implies that in equilibrium personal savings are zero.) The amount 
of profits paid to equity owners is as a result: 
(9) 1T = (Q - (W/P)L - J - rB) 
The behavior of consumers-workers 
All consumers are identical and we shall not distinguish between 
individual and aggregate values. 
Consumers derive utility from consumption and real money balances. 
Leisure does not explicitly enter the utility function; desired labor supply 
is L*. Households take as given the sequence of prices, real wages, real 
interest rates and profits paid to equity owners, as well as the sequence 
of labor they supply and the amount of goods they can buy {L, C}t=o, •.• oo. 
They maximize the present value of utility: 
-at 
u(c, M/P)e dt 
Defining A - B + M/P, the budget constraint can be written as: 
A = rA + (W/P)L + 1T - ((r +P/P) (M/P) - c) 
-at 
Define the costate variable associated with the budget constraint as eXt' 
and the Lagrangian associated with the quantity constraint on consumption 
as Ac. The Hamiltonian is then: 
H = e-Ot[u(c, M/P) + Ac(C-C) + x(rA + (W/P)L + 1T - (r +P/P)M/P - c)l 
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Necessary conditions for maximization are: 







x (r + piP) 
They can be rewritten more intuitively as follows: 






Then C = min(Cd , C) 
. 
u (C, M/p) = x (r + piP) 
m 
x = (o-r)x -ot lim e 
t-too 
A > 0 
C 
In the absence of constraints on consumption, consumers equalize the 
marginal rate of substitution between money balances and consumption to the 
nominal interest rate. The path of consumption is determined by (13) which 
gives the behavior of marginal utilitY,and the budget constraint. Approxi-
mately, (13) gives the shape of the path and the budget constraint the 
highest feasible level of this path. 
Current constraints on consumption lead to forced savings and more 
consumption later. Anticipated constraints have the same effect on 
consumpti~n as on investment. They lead to anticipated forced savings, 
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thus to a higher feasible level of consumption today. The effect is 
represented graphically in Figure 2 when 0 = rand M/P is constant, so 
that agents choose the highest feasible constant level of consumption. 
We shall introduce the government later. 
Equilibrium given prices and wages 
Equilibrium in the goods market requires that actual supply equals 
actual demand. It also requires that at most one side be constrained. 
From (2), actual aggregate supply is 
. (s ) Q = mln Q , Q 
From (4) and (11), actual aggregate demand is 
. (d Q) Q = mln Q , where 
The above conditions for equilibrium imply: 
(14) 
- s d Q = min(Q , Q ) 
- -
Q - C + J 
Rationing rules are as follows: If supply is constrained, there is 
uniform rationing of firms. If demand is constrained, consumption and 
investment are rationed according to: 
-
(15) C a € [0, 1] 
{16) J = Jd _ (1 _ a) COd - Q) 
Thus, in general, rationing depends on shadow aggregate demand. If a 
equals 0 or 1, however, there is rationing of investment only or 
consumption only. 
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In the labor market, we have assumed that firms can always hire the 
labor they demand. Thus, labor is given by: 
-(17) Q 
Movement of prices and wages 
Although there is by construction zero excess actual demand in all 
markets, shadow excess demands may be different from zero. Thus a natural 
assumption is to allow prices and wages to respond to these excess demands 
over time. (6) They are assumed to follow: 
(18) 
• d s 
pjp = SeQ - Q ) 
. . 
(19) wjw e(L - L*) + apjP 
S, e measure the response of prices and wages to goods and labor market 
conditions. a measures the degree of indexing of wages. 
Intertemporal eguilibrium 
The set of equations is reorganized and presented in Table 1. Equations 
(1.1) to (1.6) give shadow demands and supplies. These depend on three sets 
of variables, policy variables (M), state variables given from the past 
(P, w, K) and costate variables which depend on the anticipated future (q, x). 
Equations (1.7) to (1.11) show how actual demands and supplies follow from 
shadow demands and supplies. 
Equation (1.12) determines the real interest rate from equality of 
money demand and money supply. Equations (1.13) and (1.14) give the 
equations of motion of the costate variables (q, x), equations (1.16) to 





















Table 1. The complete model: eguations of motion 
d d 
L IFL(L , K) = W/P 
QSIQs = F(K, Ld ) 
Id ll + <P(Id/K) + (Id/K)<P' (Id/K) 
JdlJd = Id(l + <P(Id/K» 
d
l 
d e uc(e , M/P) = x 
QdlQd = Cd + Jd 
- . d Q = m~n(Q , QS) 
LIF(K, 
-L) = Q 
clc = Cd a(Qd - Q) 
51J 
Jd _ d -= (l-a)(Q -Q) 
IIJ 
- -
= I (1 + <P (I /K» 
. 
u (e, M/P) = x (r + pip) 
m 
x= (o-r)x 
W/W = e(L - L*) + ap/p 
. -
K = I - llK 
v = rV - (0 - (W/P)L) - J) 
q 
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equation (1.19) gives the behavior of V, which does not affect any other 
variable in the model. 
At any point of time, an intertemporal equilibrium is a sequence of 
(Ld, QS, d d d d - - - - -quantities I , J , C , Q , L, Q, I, J, c, K) and a sequence of 
prices (r, q, x, P, W, V) which, given the sequence of policy (M) and 
initial conditions (P , W , K ) satisfy equations (1.1) to (1.19) for the 
000 
current and all future periods. 
Steady state 
Before we turn to the dynamics, we briefly characterize the steady 
. . . . . 
state of the model, when P = W = K = x = q = O. We denote steady state 
values by stars. Intertemporal utility maximization implies, from (1.14), 
that r* = o. The interest rate is always equal to the subjective discount 
rate in steady state; equivalently the long-run elasticity of savings at 0 
is infinite. d From (1.3) and (1.18), as I = I , q must be sufficient to 
generate gross investment equal to depreciation: 
q* = 1 + ¢ (fl) + fl ¢ I (11) > 1 
In turn, (1.13) determines the marginal product of capital and thus the 
steady state level of capital stock: 
If fl = 0, so that q = 1, this condition reduces to the familiar condition: 
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Consumption is determined by: 
C* = F(K*, L*) - ~K*(l + ¢(~» 
Finally, the level of real money balances is given by: 
u (C* 
m ' 
Money is clearly neutral in the long run in this model. 
Section II. Comparative Dynamics 
To show the basic dynamics of the model, this section concentrates on 
the dual role of investment as a determinant of demand and later of supply 
through capital accumulation, and on the stabilizing or destabilizing role 
of prices and wages. 
Functional forms and parametrization 
To simulate the model, specific functional forms must be chosen for 
utility and technology/and numerical values must be chosen for the 
parameters. These assumptions are summarized in Table 2. 
Instantaneous utility is CES in consumption and money balances. The 
elasticity of substitution between utility in different periods is assumed 
to be unity, so that cardinal utility is logarithmic. (Under uncertainty, 
this last assumption implies unit constant relative risk aversion.) 
The production function is also CES in capital and labor. The 
installation function ¢(I/K) is linear in IlK, so that total cost of 
installation is quadratic in I. 
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The unit period is a quarter. Thus all flow variables and parameters 
with a time dimension are at quarterly rates. There is no attempt to 
calibrate the model to fit a particular economy; parameter values are 
chosen to either be reasonable, or to fit existing empirical evidence or 
to have reasonable implications. Implied steady state values for the main 
variables are given also in Table 2. A few parameters require justification. 
The elasticity of substitution between consumption and real money 
balances is also the interest elasticity of money demand. It is chosen to 
be .14, which corresponds to empirical estimates of this long-run 
1 t " "t (7) e as l.Cl y. The subjective discount rate 0 implies a steady-state 
annual interest rate of 12%, which is roughly in line with the average 
profit rate on corporate capital in the U.S. 
The convexity coefficient for installation costs, b, implies that 
a ratio of annual investment to capital of 10% leads to average installation 
costs equal to 10% of the purchase price of capital, and marginal installation 
20 h "(8) costs equal to % of purc ase prl.ce. The elasticity of substitution 0KL 
has been chosen to be relatively low, .5, to reduce the scope for substitution 
of capital and labor in response to short-run changes in factor prices. 
The price and wage adjustment parameters will be discussed later; they 
clearly do not affect the steady state. The proportion of rationing 
allocated to consumption, a, is chosen to equal approximately its share 
in aggregate demand, .9. 
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Table 2. Functional forms, parameters and steady state values 
Consumers u = E;,C 1 
( -p 
+ (1 - E;,) (M/P) 1 1 
-p rl/p 
Joo (Q,n -1St U = ut)e dt 
0 
E;, = .95 Pl = 6. 
~ a Cm = 1/ (1 + P 1) = .14 
15 = .03 
Firms 
[ 
-P2 -P 2)-1/P 2 
Q = y aK + (1 - a) L 
. 
¢(I/K) = b.(I/K) K = I - ~K 
y = .25 a = .25 
b 4.00 ~ = .025 
Rationing rules and price adjustment 
B = .03 e = .015 a = 1. 0 
a = .9 
Exogenous variables 
L* = 8.00 M = 4.0 
Implied steady state values 
Q* = 2.00 (W/P) *L* = 1. 75 r*K* = .25 
C* = 1. 78 J* = .22 I* = .20 
r* = .03 P* = 2.0 W* = .375 
q* = 1.2 V* = 9.60 K* = 8.00 
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Method of solution 
Dynamic simulations present two problems usually not encountered in 
macroeconomic simulations: 
The first is standard in rational expectations models. The initial 
values of q, x and V are not given from the past but determined from the 
requirement that the transversality conditions be satisfied. A dynamic 
simulation is thus a two-point boundary value problem, with initial 
conditions K, P, Wand terminal conditions for q, x and V, (i.e. the 
transversality conditions). The technical method of solution is that of 
multiple shooting (see [16] for details). 
The second is specific to disequilibrium models and comes from the 
presence of minimum functions. We replace the minimum function ((1.7) in 
Table 1) by a CES function with low elasticity. In practice, an elasticity 
of .005 is enough to replicate the minimum rule. 
We now turn to the simulations. (9) The first two focus on the behavior 
of quantities, and to do so, assume fixed prices and wages (8 = 8 = .0). 
Simulation 1. Demand shocks and Keynesian unemployment 
Suppose agents decide to save more in order to consume more later, 
i.e. that there is a temporary decrease in the subjective discount rate. 
More precisely, assume that 0 decreases unanticipatedly at time 0 and 
thereafter follows: 
o = .03 + .9 (0_
1 
- .03) o = .025 
o 
The effects are summarized in Table 3, for three different sets of 
values of 0cm and 0KL' 
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(Ocm = .14; 0KL = .5) 
1 2 3 
0 4 12 
-2.6 -1.6 - .7 
1.0 .2 - .1 
-1.9 -1.6 -1.0 
.0 .3 .3 
-2.0 -1.2 - .4 
3.6 2.2 .7 
2.0 1.7 .9 
High 0Cm 
(Flat LM) 
(Ocm = 2.; 0KL = .5) 
4 5 6 
0 4 12 
-6.8 -4.3 -1. 0 
-3.3 - .7 .5 
-8.7 -4.8 -1. 5 
.0 - .8 - .7 
- .4 - .4 - .0 
2.3 2.0 1.6 
11.0 5.5 1.2 
All variables are in % deviation from steady state except 
u unemployment rate, measured in % 
Low 0KL 
(Steep IS) 
(OCI'Vl= 2.; 0KL = .1) 
7 8 9 
0 4 12 
-2.5 -1.6 - .7 
-3.0 .4 .2 
-4.7 -1. 4 - .6 
.0 - .8 - .3 
-2.0 -1.2 - .8 
3.5 2.3 1.1 
5.4 1.4 .5 
r absolute deviation from steady state, measured in % at annual rate 
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The central role is played by investment. Lower aggregate demand 
lowers output and this in turn has two effects: it lowers the demand for 
money and thus the sequence of anticipated interest rates; it lowers the 
sequence of anticipated marginal profits. Which of the two lower sequences 
dominates and whether q and investment go up or down depends crucially on 
Oem and 0KL· If Oem is large, the demand for money is very interest 
elastic, interest rates decrease little and q goes down. If 0KL is very 
small, the decrease in output and employment reduces strongly marginal 
f 't(IO) dId pro 1 an q a so goes own. These two cases are shown in columns 4 
to 6 and 7 to 9 respectively. 
The response of investment in turn, through a multiplier effect, 
decreases consumption. The larger and more prolonged the decrease in 
investment, the larger the initial decline in consumption and thus the 
overall recession. The similarity of our results to the simple ISLM is 
striking: the impact effect is larger, the flatter the LM (the larger 
Oem)' the steeper the IS (the smaller 0KL)' As the recession slowly 
ends, net investment becomes positive again. In none of the three cases 
does the economy experience a supply constraint; it always remains in 
Keynesian unemployment. 
Table 3 also shows clearly the different behavior of marginal q which 
affects investment and is unobservable, and average q which might be 
observable through the stock market valuation of firms. Although q may 
go down, VIR goes up in all three cases: the effect of lower real rates 
dominates the effect of lower average profit. Thus, the stock market goes 
up while output and possibly investment go down. 
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Simulation 2. Supply shocks and classical unemployment 
Suppose that the economy is affected by an adverse, unanticipated 
technological shock which disappears over time. More precisely, assume 
that y follows after t : 
o 
(y - .25) = .9 (Y-l - .25) = .2375 
This decrease of productivity of 5% initially is in the spirit of a 
temporary increase of the price of oil (see [22] for a specific treatment 
of such an increase with a more adequate treatment of technology). The 
effects are summarized in Table 4, again for three sets of values of oem 
and 0KL' 
The central role is again played by investment, this time not as a 
component of demand but as a determinant of supply through capital 
accumulation. The impact effect on production however depends only on 
the technology: after the decrease in productivity, employment must 
decrease until the marginal product of labor is again equal to the 
unchanged real wage. The size of the adjustment depends on 0KL' If 0KL 
is low, the required decrease in employment is small; if 0KL is larger, 
the decrease is larger. The impact effect on the marginal product is 
independent of 0KL to the first order and proportional to the share of 
capital in output. 
The adjustment process and the length of the period of classical 
unemployment depends however very much on investment. Two effects are 
again present: the first is a lower sequence of real interest rates, the 
second is a lower sequence of marginal products. Whether the first or the 
second domir,ates depends again on the interest elasticity of money demand. 
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(Ocm = .14; 0KL = .5) 
1 2 3 
0 4 12 
-14.2 -7.6 -1.7 
5.9 2.7 .0 
15.2 8.2 1.6 
-10.7 -6.4 - .2 
.0 1.0 1.1 
- 7.7 -5.0 -1.4 
8.2 4.5 1.0 
See Table 3 for definitions. 
High 0Cm 
4 5 6 7 
0 4 12 0 
- 7.4 -7.4 -7.0 -6.9 
- 5.5 -3.1 - .5 2.7 
- 5.5 -4.0 -2.0 7.6 
-10.7 -9.4 -7.4 -5.8 
.0 -2.8 -4.9 .0 
.0 .0 .0 -4.6 












Columns 4 to 6 show how/if interest rates do not adjust, investment falls 
and the recession is substantially deeper and longer. 
What happens to shadow aggregate demand in the process of adjustment 
is ambiguous. Although both q and wealth may go down, the anticipation of 
constraints on both consumption and investment spending may lead both 
consumers and firms to attempt anticipatory buying. The anticipatory 
buying effect dominates in the first and third cases in Table 4, the lower 
wealth and q effect dominates in the second case. In all cases, however, 
shadow aggregate demand is less than supply and both firms and consumers 
are rationed in their purchases. Thus investment is less than the value 
implied by q. 
We now turn to the effects of price-wage dynamics on the process of 
adjustment. For this, we shall consider the effects of an unanticipated 
decrease in nominal money by 5% which is assumed by agents to be permanent. 
The reference values of 8, a, e are .03, 1., .015 respectively. The value 
of 8 implies that an excess shadow demand of 10% increases prices by 2.4% 
over a period of a year. (11) The value of a implies complete indexing of 
wages and the value of e implies that 5% unemployment in excess of the 
natural rate (zero in our model) decreases real wages by 2.4% over a 
period of a year. 
simulation 3. The adjustment of prices and the stabilizing Mundell effect 
Tobin [26] recently formalized an argument of Keynes that a fast 
adjustment of prices may lead to a larger recession in response to a 
decrease in money growth: If prices adjust fast, there will be a large 
decrease in inflation and expected inflation. Thus real rates will 
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increase both because of higher nominal rates and because of lower expected 
inflation; this second channel is usually referred to as the Mundell effect. 
Thus the faster the prices adjust, the larger the Mundell effect, the higher 
the real rate and the larger, Tobin suggests, the effect on aggregate 
(12) 
demand. 
We now check in our model the effects of the speed of adjustment of 
prices on the impact of the decrease in money and the length of the 
recession. The results are given in Table 5 for three values of S, .01, 
.03, .05. 
The Mundell effect is present: the faster the adjustment of prices, 
the larger the increase in the initial interest rate. The impact effect 
of the decrease in money is however smaller, the faster prices adjust. 
The reason for both results in this model is clear: faster price adjustment 
indeed means higher real rates initially, but lower nominal and real rates 
later as real money balances increase faster; the faster the price adjustment, 
the lower the increase in long real rates. Consumption, through wealth/and 
investment, through q,depend mostly on long real rates. The short-term rate 
has only one direct effect, given wealth and q, the effect of bending the 
path of consumption (equation (1.14)) and to induce consumers to postpone 
consumption temporarily. The simulations suggest that this effect, although 
present, is not very strong. Thus, in our model, faster price adjustment 
d h " b" I 1" (13) leads to a smaller an s orter recess~on, contrary to To ~n s ana ys~s. 
Note that the long period of high unemployment leads to lower real 
wages. In all three cases, these lower real wages require a period of 
overemployment: after the initial recession, the economy experiences a 
temporary boom, starting in quart€_" 8 in thE' first case, in quarter 16 in 
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Table 5. The adjustment of prices and the Mundell effect 
The effects of a decrease in money 





















(6 = .03) 
2 3 
4 12 



















(6 = .01) (6 = .05) 
5 6 7 8 9 
4 12 0 4 12 
-4.2 -2.5 -5.0 -1.9 1.1 
-3.9 .1 -6.1 - .6 1.7 
-7.1 -3.1 -9.0 -2.7 1.7 
3.6 7.5 .0 .3 2.8 
.8 .8 3.6 2.4 .4 
7.8 1.7 11. 2 2.4 -3.1 
- .8 -2.5 .0 -3.0 -5.7 
-5.1 -9.3 .0 -3.6 -2.7 
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the second, and quarter 6 in the third. The boom is a Keynesian boom, with 
aggregate demand below supply. The economy thereafter returns to equilibrium. 
We now turn to the effects of the speed of real wage adjustment. 
Simulation 4. Responsiveness of real wages and Keynesian unemployment 
As emphasized by many authors, a decrease in the real wage is likely 
to improve the economy in a classical regime but may well have perverse 
effects in a Keynesian regime. We now consider the effects of real wage 
responsiveness in such a case. Table 6 reports the effects of the decrease 
in money, for three different values of e, .005, .015 and .045. 
Because of our formalization of consumers and our assumption of no 
liquidity constraints, the distribution of output between profits and real 
wages has no income distribution effect on consumption. Real wages however 
have an effect on investment: For an output constrained firm, if real wages 
are anticipated to be lower for a sufficiently long period of time, the firm 
will aim at a lower capital/labor ratio and thus further decrease investment. 
The result will therefore be a further decrease in aggregate demand. 
This impact effect is there in Table 6. Large responsiveness of real 
wages leads to a larger decrease in investment and aggregate demand; the 
difference is however small across values of e. 
Of more interest is the process of adjustment which is not monotonic 
but cyclical, due to the interaction of investment, output and real wages. 
The initial period of recession and low investment is followed by a period 
of expansion and higher investment. This is particularly clear when real 
wages are very responsive. During this adjustment, aggregate demand is 
sometimes larger than aggregate supply, as in column 6 and the economy 
oscillates between Keynesian and classical regimes. 
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Table 6. Real wage responsiveness and Keynesian unemployment 
The effects of a decrease in money 
Reference case 
(8 = .015) 
1 2 3 
Quarter: 0 4 12 
Variable 
c -5.0 -2.9 - ."2 
q -6.6 -1.8 1.7 
QD -9.3 -4.5 .7 
QS .0 3.3 4.8 
r 2.4 2.0 1.2 
u 11. 6 4.6 2.4 
P .0 -2.1 -4.9 
W/P .0 -4.2 -5.0 
See Table 3 for definitions. 
Large 
responsiveness 
(8 = .045) 
4 5 6 
0 4 12 
-4.6 - 1.0 -1.0 
-7.6 - .8 2.1 
-9.7 - 2.1 4.0 
.0 14.3 .3 
2.8 4.8 -2.4 
12.1 1.3 -1.0 
.0 - 3.3 -6.3 
.0 -11.7 - .4 
Small 
responsiveness 
(8 = .005) 
7 8 9 
0 4 12 
-5.0 -3.4 -1.9 
-5.9 -1.8 .4 
-8.9 -4.9 -2.1 
.0 - .6 .3 
2.0 1.2 .4 
11.1 5.2 1.3 
.0 -1.6 -3.1 
.0 -1.4 -2.3 
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We now turn to the effects of an anticipated profit tax. 
Section III. Anticipations of a profit tax 
The accession of a socialist government obviously creates large changes 
in anticipations. Among those changes, two are likely to complicate the 
task of economic policy initially. The first is the anticipation of large 
budget deficits in the future, partially monetized and leading to higher 
inflation. The second is the anticipation of lower profits by firms, either 
because of higher real wages and compensation, or higher taxation of firms 
(see Kolm [15]). Although these anticipations may, in the case of France, 
not be warranted, real and financial decisions based on them will affect 
interest rates, the stock market, exchange rates as well as investment, 
consumption and so on. An understanding of these anticipation effects is 
important for the conduct of economic policy. In this section, we focus on 
the effects of the anticipations of lower profits, summarizing the anticipa-
tions of various changes in the tax structure by an anticipation of a higher 
tax rate on profits. 
Taxes and the government budget constraint 
For our purpose, we need to introduce only two taxes. The first is a 
tax at rate T on profit Q - (W/P)L. The second is a lump-sum tax or subsidy 
on income. The government budget constraint is: 
T(Q - (W/P)L) + T = 0 
An increase in T implies a corresponding decrease in T; thus a higher 
profit tax does not, ceteris paribus, affect the income of consumers but 
only its composition. 
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The presence of a profit tax modifies two of the equations of Table 1 
in Section I. The terms (W/P) (FK(K, L)/FL(K, Lll in equation (1.13) and 
(0 - (W/P)L) in equation (1.19) are now premultiplied by (1- T). 
The effects of an actual profit tax 
We first consider the effects of the actual implementation of an 
increase in T, from .0 to .2, unanticipated and permanent. The effects 
are summarized in Table 7. 
Two elements explain the results of Table 7. The first is the long-run 
elasticity of savings with respect to interest rates; the second, the degree 
of wage responsiveness to unemployment. 
The first is readily understood by looking at the steady state effects 
of the profit tax. In steady state, the interest rate has to remain equal 
to the subjective discount rate. As q* is also unchanged, the after-tax 
marginal product of capital is invariant to changes in the tax rate. In 
steady state, therefore, the tax is entirely shifted from capital to 
1 b 
(14) 
a or. The decrease in the capital stock depends on the elasticity 
of substitution between capital and labor. For the assumed value of .5 
for 0KL' the capital stock decreases by 14% and so does the capital labor 
ratio. The real wage is then lower by 8% and output lower by 4%. 
The degree of wage response to unemployment determines the dynamics 
of adjustment, particularly the speed at which the tax is shifted from 
capital to labor. with flexible wages, as the capital decreases and full 
employment is maintained, wages decrease, the after-tax marginal product 
increases and q returns to its steady state value. If real wages do not 
adjust, however, as the capital decreases employment too decreases. The 
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Table 7. Profit tax and real wage responsiveness 
Reference case 
(8 = .015) 
1 2 3 4 
Quarter: 0 4 12 40 
Variable 
c 1.4 2.2 -1.2 - 2.6 
q -11.1 -5.1 -2.4 - .4 
QD - 6.7 -1.1 -1. 3 - 3.8 
QS .0 -2.3 -3.9 - 4.2 
K .0 -5.1 -9.1 -13.5 
r 2.8 .8 -1.3 - .2 
u 8.3 .9 1.6 .0 
W/P .0 -2.0 -3.7 - 7.0 




(8 = .005) 
5 6 7 
0 4 12 
3.2 .1 -4.5 -
-10.9 -5.1 -2.8 -
- 4.9 .4 -3.7 -







.0 -5.0 -9.5 -16.4 
4.0 -1.1 -1.4 .0 
6.0 3.5 5.4 3.5 




















after-tax marginal product remains the same and g ~emair3 b~low its steady 
state value. In the extreme case of permanently fixf.d real Nages , this 
conflict about income distribution leads to complete capital decumulation 
over time, and zero employment. If Lf.~l w3ges respond to unemployment, the 
economy goes thrOl·g\\ ::l. protracted per iod of unemploymclt zlrId capital 
decumulation. 
Table 7 shows that the adjustment takes the economy through two regimes. 
The imposition of the tax leads to a decrease in investment demand and a 
period of Keynesian unemployment (there are two conflicting effects on 
consumption: the first is the anticipation of lower income, the second the 
anticipation of constraints on future consumption spending. In the two cases 
considered, the anticipatory buying effect dominates). As capital decumulates, 
the economy enters a phase of classical unemployment (after 4 quarters in 
the first case, 2 quarters in the second), which lasts for more than 30 
quarters in the first case, more than 50 in the second case. If the 
responsiveness of real wages to unemployment is small, capital decumulates 
below its new steady state level during the adjustment process. 
The effects of an anticipated profit tax 
Suppose now that the tax, instead of being currently implemented, is 
anticipated for some time in the future. Table 8 reports the effects of 
such anticipations. For both simulations, quarter 0 is the quarter in which 
firms start anticipating the profit tax; this quarter may be the quarter of 
the elections, or a prior quarter if the outcome of the elections was 
anticipated. In the first simulation, the profit tax is anticipated for 
. . 1 . f 12 h d (15,16) 8 quarters ahead and 1n the second Slmu at10n or quarters a ea • 
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Profit tax anticipated 
for quarter 8 
1 2 3 4 
0 4 8 12 
.9 2.1 1.3 - .9 
-5.8 -4.3 -5.0 -3.2 
-3.6 -1.6 -1.5 -1.6 
.0 -1.2 -3.1 -4.1 
.0 -3.1 -5.7 -8.0 
1.6 1.4 .3 -1.3 
4.3 .9 1.8 2.3 
.0 -1.3 -1.8 -2.8 
See Table 3 for definitions. 
Profit tax anticipated 
for quarter 12 
5 6 7 8 
0 4 8 12 
.7 1.4 1.0 .8 
-4.1 -3.0 -3.4 -4.4 
-2.6 -1.2 -1.2 -1.8 
.0 - .9 -2.2 -3.1 
.0 -2.2 -4.0 -5.6 
1.2 .9 .3 .3 
3.0 .7 1.2 1.8 
.0 - .9 -1.3 -1.8 
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The effects are simple. The change in anticipation leads to a 
substantial decline in investment (and a decrease in the stock market of 
7% in the first case, 5% in the second). This decline in investment demand 
leads to a Keynesian recession. As capacity decreases, the economy goes 
into classical unemployment even before the profit tax is implemented. The 
process of adjustment after the implementation is similar to the one 
described above. (17) 
Thus anticipations of a profit tax lead first to Keynesian unemployment, 
then, later on, to classical unemployment. How can the government stabilize 
employment, in the context of this model? 
Most obviously, if the government does not plan an increase in profit 
taxes, it may attempt to modify anticipations by the presentation of a 
credible set of fiscal policies for the short and medium terms. 
Second, the government may use a short-term expansionary policy to 
avoid the initial recession, while anticipations of a profit tax disappear. 
This may be done by measures to help either consumption or investment. 
Helping consumption may not be successful if the economy is already close to 
classical unemployment. Helping investment may increase both demand and 
supply. Thus, the most successful policy may be, ironically, a temporary 
reduction in the profit tax, which has effects both directly and as a signal 
of the government's intentions, 
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Conclusion 
The effect of a policy on the economy depends very much on whether it 
has been anticipated or not, on how long it is expected to last and so on. 
The model developed in this paper, which allows for rational firms and 
households, as well as for imperfectly flexible prices, is well adapted to 
characterize the effects of policy in such cases. 
It is obviously too preliminary to be a reliable guide to policy: The 
lack of foundations of price inertia, the infinite life assumption which 
implies no income distribution effects, the closed economy assumption all 
need to be relaxed. We believe however that, such as it is, it can shed 
light on the effects of policy. 
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Footnotes 
(1) We believe that models of price inertia will lead to price structures 
in which relative prices, except for the real wage, are approximately 
correct, but in which their average level, the price level, does not 
adjust quickly. As this paper relies on price level and real wage 
inertia only (and so implicitly assumes all other relative prices to 
be flexible), we feel that results would not be drastically changed 
by a more explicit derivation of price behavior. 
(2) This strong assumption allows us to formalize agents and firms as 
solving certainty problems. While convenient, and probably necessary 
at this stage, it does not allow us to look at the effects of 
uncertainty per se on behavior. 
(3) Costs of adjustment are a simple way of deriving a well-behaved 
flow investment demand. The specific functional form is a special 
case of Lucas [17] which preserves CRTS of technology with respect to 
K, L, I. This subsection builds heavily on Abel [1], Hayashi [13] 
and Blanchard [9]. 
(4) Considering the effects of a change in output only makes sense for an 
output constrained firm. The "neoclassical" approach is slightly 
confusing in this respect when it treats output as given, but maintains 
the assumption that the wage equals the marginal product of labor. 
(5) Around WIP = FL(K, L) and for L given by Q = F(K, L) the effect of a 
change in output on marginal profit is given by: 
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where aKL is the elasticity of substitution between K and L. Thus, 
the smaller a KL , the larger the effects of a decrease in output on 
marginal profit. 
(6) An alternative formalization would be to solve for flexible prices 
and wages and assume partial adjustment of actual prices and wages. 
In the absence of more explicit assumptions about the source of price 
and wage inertia, it is difficult to decide which formalization is 
better. 
(7) The time-separable utility function we use implies the same short- and 
long-run elasticities of money demand with respect to both consumption 
and interest rates. 
(8) Actual estimates of this installation cost coefficient, b, derived from 
regressions of investment on market value, are much higher. They are 
however implausibly high and likely to be biased upwards (see [7]). 
(9) Checking global stability before proceeding with simulations would be 
desirable but is impossible. Checking local stability is feasible. 
Stability conditions would combine the results of Blanchard and Kahn 
[10] for linear systems with rational expectations and the results of 
Ito [14] for systems with regimes and possibly discontinuous derivatives. 
We have not checked them but have not encountered problems of convergence 
in simulations. 
(10) See footnote (5). 
(11) There is inflation therefore only if there is excess demand for goods. 
This assumption is acceptable only because we have assumed a zero rat-e 
of growth of money. If this rate of growth were positive, the price 
equations would have L) be modif:i.ed. 
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(12) The Mundell effect is currently felt in the u.s. where as the result of 
lower money growth, high nominal rates and lower inflation have led to 
short-term real rates around 8%. 
(13) To reverse these results and obtain the Tobin result, the short-term 
rate must have a strong impact on economic activity. This may be the 
case if, for example, there are institutional restrictions in financial 
markets, leading to rationing of specific sectors such as housing, when 
short rates increase. 
(14) The result that the interest rate remains unchanged and that the tax is 
ultimately shifted to labor follows from the assumption that agents are--
or act as if they were--infinitely long lived. If agents have finite 
horizons, the tax would only be partially shifted to labor. If, however, 
the economy is small and open and there are no restrictions on capital 
movements, the steady-state interest rate would again equal the foreign 
interest rate and the tax would be fully shifted to labor. 
(15) Firms are unlikely to have such precise anticipations. They are more 
likely to think that the profit tax rate may be increased with some 
probability which is an increasing function of time. We could formalize this 
by considering the sequence of expected values of their subjective 
distribution of tax rates. We could not however characterize the 
effects of uncertainty per se on their behavior. 
(16) If the government does not actually intend to increase the profit tax, 
these simulations give only the anticipated future as of quarter O. 
If in quarter 8 in the first case (or 12 in the second), there is no 
increase in the profit tax and agents revise their anticipations, the 
outcome in quarters 8 and followir~ will be different from Table 8. 
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(17) In this case, excess shadow demand for goods is never very large and 
thus there is no substantial inflation. It is however quite possible 
to generate as a result of an adverse supply shock (profit tax, 
increased price of some input or technological shock), a period of 
classical unemployment, a decrease in capital accumulation due to the 
conflict in income distribution and substantial inflation as chronic 
excess demand remains. Such an outcome may have some explanatory power 
for what happened in the second half of the '70s. 
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